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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Appellants do not espouse "public nudity" and the suggestion to that effect by Defendant is 
an attempt to take the attention of the Court off of the very real issues of free expression whaich are 
presented here. If this ordinance is an attempt to redefine public nudity, it is at odds with State law 
and previous rulings of this Court. 
Defendant espouses the discredited constitutional doctrine of "original intent" which would 
require Courts to restrict individual rights to those recognized in the 17th or 18th centuries. This 
Court has previously construed the State Constitution to protect rights which are important to 
citizens of today, including the right to be free from unreasonable interference with free expression. 
The ordinance at issue here is not a reasonable or necessary "time, place or manner" 
1 
restriction; and it is not related to legitimate governmental objectives, such as the suppression of 
"negative secondary effects." As a measure directed at censorship, it does not enjoy a presumption 
of constitutionality, but the burden remains with the government to justify it. 
The claims of Plaintiff Reid were not litigated below and are not ripe for decision here. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLEE MISCHARACTERIZES APPELLANTS AS FAVORING "PUBLIC NUDITY." 
Defendant starts its brief by reviewing a history of "public nudity" under English Common 
Law and early American Law. It concludes that public nudity was prohibited by both Common Law 
and Early American law, and cited examples of enforcement against those exposing themselves in 
public places. Ttait might be relevant if the ordinance at issue was a public nudity law. It is not. 
It is specifically designed to apply only to licensed adult entertainment establishments. See § 
5.56.310 G. of the South Salt Lake Code, cited at the beginning of both Plaintiffs and Defendants 
briefs. This court recently reviewed and applied a "public lewdness" or "public nudity" law in Salt 
Lake City v. Keith Roberts, 2002 UT 30, 44 P.3d 767 (Utah 2002). That case did not reach 
constitutional issues; but it defined public lewdness or nudity in a manner that applied only when 
that conduct was "capable of observance by persons from the general community." 2000 UT 30, ^ 
29. A person, under this Couifs analyses, could still avoid criminal sanctions if he showed that his 
expectation of privacy (from the observation from the general community) was reasonable. See 
Schmitt v. State, 590 So.2d 404, 410, where the Florida court held that public lewdness requires: 
2 
. . . an intentional act of sexual indulgence or public indecency, when such causes offense 
to one or more persons viewing it or otherwise intrudes upon the rights of others. [The] 
terms "lewd" and "lascivious" thus mean something more than a negligent disregard of the 
accepted standards of decency, or even an intentional but harmlessly discreet unorthodoxy. 
Acts are neither "lewd nor lascivious" unless they substantially intrude upon the rights of 
others (internal citations omitted). 
This ordinance was not designed to deal with public nudity. The dancing activity at issue 
here is not observable by those wh< * lecifically seek it out and paj an admission chai ge Tlie 
ordinance at issue here is thus easily distinguishable from that upheld by that of the United States 
Supreme Court in Citvof Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 I IS 2 7: (2000) Plaintiff concedes that public 
nudity is not expressive per se, and that all nudity is not entitled to the protection of either Hie 111 liled 
States Constitution or that of this State. This ordinance is, like that struck down in Nakatomi 
Investments v. City of Schenectady; l.'4'"i" I" ,Mip|t vhh (\ i h IN in I*>l>7) aimed specifically at 
expressive nudity in entertainment productions. Further, it is aimed only at the expressive nudity 
in certain establishments, and would not include that in "legitimate" theaters or other entertainment 
\ eriu.es. 
Defendant also states that Utah has traditionally punished sexual conduct both in private and 
in public, and quotes a case from 1912 upholding a conviction for fornication. See discussion of 
"original intent" in Point II below. This Court had ai, -apiviiaaih in Roberts to takt a p, -..lion 
consistent with the one advocated by Defendant here. In that case, the City of Salt Lake argued that 
sexual conduct lli.il could be seen by a police officer while lawfully executing his duties (crawling 
under a truck) had been criminalized; and the City cited cases, including State v. Lee, 633 P.2d 48 
(Utah 1981) which minimized the expectation of privacy for Fourth Amendment purposes. This 
Court declined Hie ('itv's invitation in infnpnl pultln Irwdiu^ \AW in line wild ii I mirth 
Amendment analyses, just as other States have done. See People v. MacNamara, 585 N.E.2d 793 
(N.Y. 1991). The State of Utah has not actively prosecuted fornication since 1912. Members of the 
legal community and the general public have long since come to assume that private sexual conduct 
is protected by an inherent right of privacy, and is "none of the business" of the State or its political 
subdivisions. Defendant even goes so far as to suggest that Article XXIV § 2 of the Constitution of 
Utah maintains the common law (including nudity prohibitions) in Utah until specifically repealed. 
That is not what the Constitution says. It refers only to territorial laws passed by the legislature, and 
not common law. Common law crimes were long ago abolished in Utah by the legislature. See §76-
1-105 U.C.A. (1974). Defendant, in its analysis of First Amendment jurisprudence promulgated by 
the United States Supreme Court, correctly concludes that the decisions of that court are 
"unpredictable and inconsistent." Defendant goes on to say "in the Supreme's Court's nude dancing 
cases, the rational for upholding the challenged laws differs from justice to justice, an individual 
justices change their rationales from case to case." Plaintiffs would have to agree with that 
statement. This has led to impassioned dissents and plurality opinions which cannot logically be 
sustained. What is consistent, however, is the repeated assertion by that Court that "nude dancing 
of the type at issue here is expressive conduct." Erie v. Pap's A.M.. 529 U.S. at 289. This is 
consistent, of course, with the development of modern constitutional law. Freedom of speech and 
of the press comes in many forms. While novels that exude sexuality were once "banned in Boston" 
it has long become clear that the Constitution of this country protects that sort of expression, even 
when it is sexual in nature. See Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966). The Supreme 
Court agreed that dance as entertainment was also expressive conduct, deserving protection of the 
First Amendment, in Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc.. 422 U.S. 922 (1975). In that case, the Supreme Court 
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struck down a local ordinance which "would prohibit the performance of the 'Ballet Africains' and 
a number of other works o( unquestionable artistic and socially redeeming significance. 422 U.S. 
at 933." To avoid the possibility of such censorship, the court found the ordinance vold on its face, 
though the specific "bar room" nude dancing involved in the case "may involve only the barest 
minimum ot pinkrlcil cx(»it.;ssnni " \j) 
It is acknowledged that many of the constitutional protections which have been extended to 
individuals by both State and Federal courts have involved incremental advances injudicial ruling, 
ago. In its day, the pronouncements of Thomas Jefferson that mankind "are endowed by their creator 
with certain inalienable rights" was a very radical concept. It has been certainly since 1912 that the 
courts of both this State and the Federal courts have dtlcin in icd (kif uui Sf;tfe and Federal h'lls of 
rights do indeed protect the rights of individuals to be free to a substantial extent from government 
' siioopnit'" into iiiicii privitR: ailiiirs, Jtisl <is most Utahns would assume that their private sexual 
conduct is indeed private, few would argue with the decision of the United States Si iprei ne Court 
in Stanley v. Georgia. 394 U.S. 557 (1969) that private viewing of even "pornographic" materials 
is outsid'"1 <^ ' i It "tmut*' goientntent mini si 11 ioo» ulic Stale of Georgia many more years to 
officially pronounce that sexual activity between consenting adults, in private, is indeed private. See 
Powell v. State, 510 SE.2d 18 (u A J 998), i iven without such a clear pronouncement by this court, 
Utahns have long since become secure in the knowledge th^ / 
simply does not occur in this state. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT'S APPEALS TO "ORIGINAL INTENT' FROM OTHER STATES FINDS NO 
SUPPORT IN ITS CITATIONS. 
Plaintiffs, in their main brief, cited several instances of state courts, including this Court, 
which have diverged from federal interpretations of the Bill of Rights. Defendant expresses much 
satisfaction over a recent Oregon Court of Appeals decision in State v. Ciancanelli. 181 Or. App. 1, 
45 P.3d 451 (Or. App. 2002). In that case, the Oregon Court of Appeals seems to diverge from the 
decisions of the Oregon Supreme Court regarding public sexual expressions. In that case, the 
Defendant was charged with presenting a live sex show for an audience. Defendant contended that 
he was able to do so under State v. Henry. While acknowledging Henry as the prevailing Supreme 
Court opinion, the Court of Appeals found: 
In short, however quaint it may seem to us a century and a half later, the historical record 
establishes beyond peradventure that the framers of the Oregon Constitution did not 
understand Article I, section 8, to provide protection against state regulation of public sexual 
intercourse and masturbation. To the contrary, the notion that the state or federal constitution 
protected public sexual conduct was unknown until well into the twentieth century. We 
therefore conclude that the regulation of that same conduct under ORS 167.062 is wholly 
contained within a well-established historical exception. 45 P.3d at 460. 
Obviously, the expressive conduct which the Plaintiffs have been licensed to provide for 
many years in South Salt Lake has little in common with the live sex show at issue in this case. The 
majority opinion in the Oregon Court of Appeals, however, is based on a historical analysis of the 
Oregon Constitution that has been soundly rejected by the Oregon Supreme Court. This Court has 
often acknowledged the Utah Constitution as a living document. Our State Constitution prohibits, 
among other things, "unreasonable searches and seizures." In State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 
1990) this Court said: 
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An increasing number of state courts are relying on an analysis of the search and seizure 
provisions of their own constitutions to expand or maintain constitutional protection beyond 
the scope mandated by the Fourth Amendment 794 P,2d at 465. 
The court went on to say: 
The time has come for this court, in applying an automobile exception to the warrant 
requirement of article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution to try to simplify, if possible, the 
search and seizure rules so that they can be more easily followed by the police and the courts 
and, at the same time, provide the public with consistent and predictable protection against 
unreasonable searches and seizures. This can be accomplished buy eliminating some of the 
confusing exceptions to the warrant requirement that have been developed by federal law in 
recent years. 794 P.2d at 469. 
This Court has alwnvs assuniai Mini (In prnlu doth of llir SiLilc i uiishliilniri ."Jin III mm 
parallel to those of the United States Constitution, are at least equal to those of the U.S. Constitution. 
W hen, however, this Court determines that the protection of individual liberty contained in the 
Federal Constitution, and enunciated by the federal courts, is not adequa e 
State Constitution to defend those freedoms. Building on Larocco, this court, in State v. Thompson. 
8 •* J'M l o p j i H l a l sl<il<: coii'.litiiiilioiwl p i o k t IIOJLS l u r l l u - . e q u e s t i o n t h e r e w a s 
whether the State, in a criminal proceeding, could validly subpoena bank records. That question had 
been answered in the affirmative by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Miller. 425 
US 435 (1976) where 1 h< ; Coui t said: 
The checks are not confidential communications but negotiable instruments to be used in 
commercial transactions. All of the documents obtained, including financial statements and 
deposit slips, contain only information voluntarily conveyed to the banks and exposed to 
their employees in the ordinary course of business. 425 US at 442. 
This Court first noted that several other state courts had found additional protection in their 
stale GoMtliliilioii», ami tlit'ii sdiU A .: 
We hold that under article I section 14 of the Utah Constitution, defendants under the facts 
of this case had a right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures of their bank 
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statements, "checks, savings, bonds, loan applications, loan guarantees, and all papers which 
[they] supplied to the bank to facilitate the conduct of [their] financial affaires upon the 
reasonable assumption that the information would remain confidential." (Quoting decisions 
from Pennsylvania and California) 810 P.2d at 418 
In neither of these decisions did this Court resort to minutes of the Constitutional Convention 
held in the 1800fs. In neither case did this Court wonder aloud about the specific intentions 
regarding bank documents of the founding fathers in 1789, or their successors in 1896. The 
constitution of Utah required this Court to protect its citizens against the "unreasonable" actions of 
the State in their fervor to root out crime. It is perfectly valid and constitutionally sound for this 
Court to decide that the Federal courts have not been zealous enough in protecting citizens against 
the prying eyes of the state. Likewise, in State v. Roberts, supra. Salt Lake City made the argument 
that it is reasonable, and within the language of the law, to give its police officers the right to peep 
in windows, crawl under trucks and otherwise invasively intrude on the private conduct of its 
citizens. This Court declined to give them that authority. Defendant has argued over and over that 
the conduct complained of is public in nature and open for all to see. It is that public nature, we are 
told, that gives the City and the State the right to step in and prohibit it. This court has previously 
rejected such entreaties and should do so again now. 
The Oregon Supreme Court, in City of Portland v. Tidvman. 759 P.2d 242 (Or. 1988) 
specifically rejected interference with expression in an effort to deal with "secondary effects." The 
ordinance at issue in Tidvman recited the usual allegations of lowered property values, higher crime, 
and other "secondary effects" associated with adult businesses, and then proceeded to zone such 
businesses into a small and closely regulated portion of the City. The Oregon Supreme Court stated: 
In short, the problem with the city's asserted "concern with the effect of speech," is that the 
operative text of the ordinance does not specify adverse effects that constitute the "nuisance" 
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attributable to the sale of "adult" materials and therefore does not apply only when these 
adverse effects are shown to occur or imminently threaten to occur. Rather, the ordinance 
makes a one-time legislative determination that retailing substantial quantities of sexually 
oriented pictures and words within the proscribed area will have adverse effects that retailing 
other pictures and words would not have, and that it therefore can be restricted as a 
"nuisance" by a law describing the materials rather than the effects. By omitting the 
supposed adverse effects as an element in the regulatory standard, the ordinance appears to 
consider the "nuisance" to be the characteristics of the " adult" materials rather than 
secondary characteristics and anticipated effects of the store. Such law making is what 
Article I, section 8 forbids. 789 P.2d at 248. 
There is no legal basis to suggest that the Oregon Court of Appeals, an inferior court, has 
overruled these clear pronouncements of the Oregon Supreme Court. In fact, constitutional 
amendments specifically seeking to overturn Tidvman have been twice proposed by the Oregon 
legislature. Most recently in the 2000 general election, the people of Oregon refused to accede to 
such a change. Plaintiffs agree with Defendant that the pronouncements of the United States 
Supreme Court in this area have not always been well reasoned, consistent, or sufficient, to even a 
majority of the justices. Plaintiffs contend, however, that the logic of the Oregon Court in this case 
is most persuasive. Secondary effects, if they exist, can be directly addressed by any number of 
valid uses of the police power, without suppressing the expression itself. See dissent of Justice 
Stephens in City of Erie in which he stated: 
In what can most delicately be characterized as an enormous understatement, the plurality 
concedes that "requiring dancers to wear pasties and G-strings may not greatly reduce these 
secondary effects." Ante, at 301. To believe that the mandatory addition of pasties and a G-
string will have any kind of noticeable impact on secondary effects requires nothing short 
of a titanic surrender to the implausible. 529 U.S. at 323. 
Plaintiffs acknowledge that following the logic of Tidvman an Nakatomi may subject this 
9 
court to some criticism. South Salt Lake politicians, however, have their own agenda and priorities. 
Certainly "Community Defense Counsel" the Arizona group which assisted in drafting this 
ordinance, has theirs (See www.communitydefense.org). They are not the same as those of this 
Court, which is given the duty to protect its citizens against the excesses of the government, even 
when that is not a popular thing to do. 
POINT III 
ALAMEDA BOOKS IS AT LEAST A PARTIAL REPUDIATION OF RENTON, AND 
INCREASES THE BURDEN OF THE CITY TO JUSTIFY DIRECT RESTRICTIONS ON 
SPEECH AND EXPRESSION. 
Defendant contends that Alameda Books is a reaffirmation of Renton; and that the City's 
ordinance should be upheld if based on any evidence "reasonably believed to be relevant." The City 
goes on to state that Alameda Books involved a "unique" situation, and that it is thus "of 
questionable relevance to the issues in this case." It then makes a tremendous leap and states 
"Plaintiffs therefore cannot cast direct doubt on the City's legislative record any more than they can 
successfully contend against U.S. Supreme Court cases that are in point."(Appellee Br. p.31). That 
statement is made after the explanation as to why U.S. Supreme Court decisions which might 
support Plaintiffs" position should be disregarded by this court. The legal conclusions reached by 
the City in this regard are without foundation. The U.S. Supreme court has not prohibited a party 
from "cast[ing] direct doubt on the City's legislative record." Plaintiffs referred extensively to City 
ofErie in their previous brief, including the notation that the Erie ordinance "is on its face a general 
prohibition on public nudity."(Aplt. Br. p. 12). Plaintiffs pointed out (Aplt. Br. p. 28-29) that the 
Supreme Court had referred to the opportunities the Plaintiffs had "to contest the council's findings 
about secondary effects — before the council itself, throughout the state proceedings, and before this 
10 
Court." At least as far as the prohibition of nudity is concerned, the exception to Renton started with 
City of Erie, not with Alameda Books. Plaintiffs have, from the beginning, attempted to contest the 
council's findings about secondary effects. In doing so, they submitted substantial material to the 
South Salt Lake City Council for review. The City filed affidavits before the trial court, by the 
mayor and members of the City Council, as to the "opportunity to review and be familiar with the 
volume of materials provided by the city staff." (R. 207-220). A reference to some of that material 
is included in a section designated as "Purpose and Findings" at the beginning of the subject 
ordinance. Defendant's brief refers to those findings as sufficient to present a legislative record in 
support of the ordinance. That argument was accepted by the trial court in its memorandum decision 
where the Court said "additionally, the legislative record of the ordinance establishes that the South 
Salt Lake City Council did more than rely on secondary effects studies from other cities." (R. 481). 
That statement is backed up by a footnote: 
In this regard, it is undisputed the evidence was presented to the Council members prior to 
their decision on the issue. Consequently, although the council member's [sic] specific 
thoughts may never be known, claims that this is critical to a determination of the 
reasonableness of their decision is without merit. Id. 
That statement is particularly curious, because it does not state what additional evidence 
beyond "secondary effects studies from other cities" may have been considered; and then it appears 
to state that it isn't important anyway. 
Among the "secondary effects studies from other cities" and not mentioned in the "findings" 
section of the ordinance is a detailed study from the City of Atlanta which no correlation between 
nudity and secondary effects. The official Fulton County study, dated in 1997 and containing more 
than 500 pages of support, was submitted to the City Council by Plaintiffs. See discussion below 
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of Flanigan's Enterprises. So was a new study from Fort Wayne, Indiana, and conducted by Dr. 
Dan Linz, a professor of Communication and Law and Society at the University of California, Santa 
Barbara. Dr. Linz submitted additional written testimony and scholarly articles, including 
"Debunking the Legal Myth of Negative Secondary Effects", published in the Journal of 
Communication Law and Policy in 2001 (R. 219-222). Dr. Linz indicated his willingness to testify 
personally before the City Council, and is an anticipated witness in any trial of this matter on the 
merits. Defendants attempt to buttress their basically non-existent "legislative record" by referring 
specifically to the "Purpose and Findings" portion of the ordinance, including 25 specific findings 
(Appellee Br. p. 28). Plaintiffs, through counsel, rebutted those "Findings" in detail in a letter 
submitted to the City Council, dated March 27, 2001, about a month before the ordinance was 
passed. A copy of that letter is included as an Addendum to this brief. No response was ever made. 
No reference was made by the City in any of its materials to this evidence, with the exception of it 
being included in a list of materials submitted, attached to the affidavit of Councilman Bill 
Anderson. It is unknown whether it was brought to the attention of, or considered by, any member 
of the City Council. Plaintiffs believe that, were this material read or considered, it would make it 
"less reasonable" to believe the poorly written, poorly researched, and scientifically unsound 
materials provided by out-of-state special interests. It is a question of fact whether the City Council 
"reasonably believed" that they were fighting secondary effects in a manner reasonably calculated 
to actually reduce these effects. And Plaintiffs have a right to present facts disputing these 
allegations. 
While Plaintiffs were at least able to proffer their material (ignored though it was) to the City 
Council, they were unable to put on direct any evidence before the District Court. The District Court 
12 
did review the affidavits of Plaintiffs and was aware of the material allegedly "considered" by the 
City Council. The District Court refused to consider any of this material as relevant to its decision. 
Plaintiffs, in their own Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, asked the court to reserve for trial 
"whether the Constitutional rights of Plaintiffs are overridden by a legitimate, reasonable, and 
necessary assault on negative secondary effects." (R. 465). Plaintiffs also pointed out the total lack 
of record of debate in the City Council, and the lack of reference in any manner (other than the 
"canned" preamble provided the city by Mr. Bergthold's special interest law firm) to concerns over 
secondary effects in the city. The contradictory information provided by Plaintiffs, and their expert 
testimony, is indeed relevant to the question of the validity of this ordinance. See Opinion of Justice 
Souter, concurring in part and dissenting in part in City of Erie: 
The proposition that the presence of nude dancing establishments increases the incidence of 
prostitution and violence is amenable to empirical treatment, and the city councilors who 
enacted Erie's ordinance are in a position to look to the facts of their own community's 
experience as well as to experience's elsewhere. Their failure to do so is made all the clearer 
by one of the amicus briefs, largely devoted to the argument that scientifically sound studies 
show no such correlation. See Brief for First Amendment Lawyers Association as Amicus 
Curiae 16-23, Id At App. 1-29. Footnote 3, 529 U.S. at 314-5. 
Perhaps the first successful use of the "opportunity to contest the councils findings about 
secondary effects" occurred in Flanigan's Enterprises. Inc. of Georgia v. Fulton County GA.. 242 
F.3d 976 (11th Cir. 2001) Cert, denied 122 S.Ct. 2556 (2002). In that case, the Fulton County Board 
of Commissioners (Atlanta, Ga.) ordered the Fulton County Police Department, the County Attorney 
and the Department of Economic Development "to conduct a study on the secondary effects of 
alcohol consumption in adult entertainment establishments located in Fulton County." The staff was 
also ordered to assemble studies from other jurisdictions, similar to those used in the "findings" of 
South Salt Lake. According to the Court: 
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The resolution further stated the Board's intent "to enact, if wanted by said studies, a 
"carefully tailored regulation to minimize the negative secondary effects of the serving and 
consumption of alcoholic beverages at adult entertainment establishments...." 
The study concluded that, for the time period Jan. 1,1995 through May 31,1997, there was 
no statistical correlation showing an increase in crime at adult entertainment establishments 
that served alcoholic beverages. Rather, the statistics indicated greater instances of calls for 
service and reported crime at non-adult entertainment establishments that served alcoholic 
beverages. 242 F.3d at 979. 
As a check on the government study, several adult entertainment establishments conducted 
their own study of the economic impact they had on surrounding property. Once again, according 
to the court "the study revealed high occupancy and rental rates in existing buildings, expensive 
improvements, business expansions, turn away business volume and proposed development in the 
clubs' vicinities." Id 
In further response, the Board of Commissioners hired its own appraiser to review the studies 
provided by the clubs. Once again, the results were disappointing for the City: "Based on the 
marked data provided by LDA, Inc., Dabney found that the Clubs has caused no diminution of 
property values or rents." Id at 980. Nevertheless, the City persisted and held two public 
meetings on November 19 and December 17 of 1997, resulting in a new ordinance with a preamble 
amazingly similar to that of South Salt Lake: 
WHEREAS, based on the experience of other urban counties and municipalities, which 
experiences the Board of Commissioners finds are relevant to the problems faced by Fulton 
County, Georgia, and which do not very greatly among generally comparable communities 
within this country, the Boards of Commissioners finds that public nudity, under certain 
circumstances, particularly circumstances related to the sale and consumption of alcoholic 
beverages in adult entertainment facilities offering live entertainment, begets criminal 
behavior and tends to create undesirable community conditions; 
WHEREAS, the limitation of nude conduct in establishments licensed to sell alcohol for 
consumption on the premises is in the public welfare, and is a matter of government interest 
and concern to prevent the occurrence of criminal behavior and undesirable community 
14 
conditions normally associated with establishments which serve alcohol and also allow or 
encourage nudity. IdL at 980-1. 
The City went on, in its new ordinance, to prohibit nudity in adult establishments involving 
the sale of alcohol. The Eleventh Circuit reviewed the decision of the District Court: 
The district court concluded that Section 18-76 was constitutional as a matter of law because, 
like the ordinance in Sammy's Section 18-76 was amended to prevent negative secondary 
effects related to nude dancing, and therefor, furthered a substantial government interest 
unrelated to free expression. The court reasoned that the experiences of other urban areas 
provided the requisite factual basis for the Board's state justification that nude dancing 
begets criminal behavior and tends to create undesirable community conditions. Moreover, 
the district court rejected Plaintiffs' arguments that the Board, in face of contradictory local 
studies, unreasonably relied on outdated and foreign studies that focused on the location of 
adult entertainment businesses rather than the relationship between alcohol and live nude 
entertainment. Id at 981-2. 
The Eleventh Circuit reviewing the ordinance under the O'Brien intermediate scrutiny test, 
accepted at face value the City's declaration that the ordinance was intended to target negative 
secondary effects. It accepted the ordinance on its face as satisfactory of the third and fourth prongs 
of the test. The problem, the court found, was with the second prong of the test which requires that 
the ordinance furthers a substantial interest within the power of the government. Regarding this 
prong, the Court said: 
In order to meet their burden under this element, the Defendants must have "some factual 
basis for the claim that [adult] entertainment in establishments serving alcoholic beverages 
results in increased criminal activity" and other undesirable community conditions. Id at 
985. 
The court went on to state: "our own cases demonstrate that we require some reasonable 
justification for legislation which suppresses, albeit incidently, protected expression." Id. And it 
further stated: 
Unlike in Pap's and Sammy's, where the plaintiffs never challenged the cities' findings, the 
Fulton County Clubs challenged and disproved the Board's finding. The evidence in the 
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record relating to conditions in Fulton County shows unequivocally that property values in 
neighborhoods adjoining the clubs have increased during the time the Clubs have been in 
existence, and that surrounding buildings show no signs of blight or lack of physical 
maintenance. Moreover, the Fulton County police study found greater reported crime 
connected with establishments that served alcohol but did not feature adult entertainment. 
In other words, local studies commissioned by both the Clubs and the Board found no 
evidence of the secondary effects with which the Board was purportedly concerned. The 
question thus becomes, was it reasonable for Defendants to ignore relevant local studies and 
rely instead upon remote foreign studies in determining whether adverse secondary effects 
were attributable to the Fulton County Clubs? 
We do not think that Defendants had any reasonable justification for amending Section 18-76 
when the county's own studies negated the very interests it purportedly sought to prevent. 
The case might be different were the Clubs a recent addition to Fulton County 
neighborhoods. It is undisputed, however, that Plaintiffs have continually operated these 
adult entertainment establishments for nearly a decade. Id. at 986. 
It is indeed relevant that Plaintiffs have operated their clubs in South Salt Lake for many 
years. The record of their problems, or lack thereof, is not hard to obtain; and Plaintiffs have offered 
to show their effect on the community, in an evidentiary hearing, from the time this action was first 
filed. The Affidavits of Hal Cannon (R. 142-155), Jerry Nielsen (R. 349-357), and Gayle Petersen 
(R. 358-368) are sufficient to overcome summary judgment. The affidavits squarely address the 
questions of secondary effects and put them at issue. Plaintiffs state they have not been convicted 
of any "SOB violations" for many years. They allude to the fact that they have long been required 
to post bonds for any civil penalties associated with their businesses, and state there have been no 
attempts to use those bonds. Hal Cannon, the CEO of American Bush is the record owner of the 
building in which the business is housed, as is Gayle Petersen. Their affidavits claim that the y have 
spent considerable sums of money upgrading their buildings, and that they add to, rather than detract 
from, their neighborhood. Mr. Cannon specifically stated under oath that his building valuation 
had increased from $258,000 to $434,000 in the five years previous to his affidavit. Plaintiffs also 
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allege in their affidavits, that the ordinance is not designed to further regulate their businesses, but 
to shut them down. The action of the City in cutting the number of alcoholic beverage licenses, at 
the same time as this ordinance was passed (R. 255-261) is more than a coincidence, and raises 
additional factual issues. If anything, the decision in Alameda Books moves towards the 
adoption of the position of the Eleventh Circuit that the findings of the city are subject to rebuttal 
by the Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs in this case did submit material to the City Council tending to negate the 
information received from Mr. Bergthold's organization. Whether the City ignored it by failing to 
read it, or read it and then ignored it is not as important as the fact that it was clearly not taken into 
account. These Plaintiffs have not, in any sense, waived the right to produce evidence on whether 
the City's attack on secondary effect is reasonable under the circumstances. They have proclaimed 
their willingness to provide this evidence to the city and to the trial court, at every opportunity. See 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction, (R. 51-76), Plaintiffs' Reply 
Memorandum (R.264-282) and Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 404-440). Renton 
may be read by some to justify the view that the City is reasonably attacking its urban problems if 
it says it is. This position has been eroded by City of Erie, Flanigan's. and now by Alameda Books. 
at least as it relates to the absolute prohibition of nude dancing. Defendant's brief maintains that this 
ordinance is not an absolute prohibition, but the same kind of "time, place and manner restriction" 
as in Renton. But see again the dissent of Justice Stephens in City of Erie: 
The plurality relies on the so-called "secondary effects" test to defend the ordinance. Ante 
at 290-296. The present use of that rationale, however, finds no support whatsoever in our 
precedents. Never before have we approved the use of that doctrine to justify a total ban on 
protected First Amendment expression. On the contrary, we have been quite clear that the 
doctrine would not support that end. (529 U.S. at 318). 
The Supreme Court did not simply reverse the Summary Judgment rendered by the Ninth Circuit, 
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but remanded the case for a trial on the contested and relevant issues of fact. Plaintiffs in this 
instance deserve that same opportunity. 
POINT IV 
THE ORDINANCE AT ISSUE IS IN CONFLICT WITH THE GENERAL LAWS OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH. 
Defendant suggests that Plaintiffs argument on this point is "opaque." One wonders if it 
would be more suitable to counsel if it were "transparent." Nevertheless, whether Defendant's 
counsel is confused or not, the argument is fairly simple. For most of its brief, Defendant claims that 
this is an issue of "public nudity." That term appears over and over in Appellee's brief. Plaintiff 
merely points out that public nudity has been defined by the state of Utah, and that the definition 
appears to apply only to nudity where unsuspecting passers-by might see, and be offended by it. In 
the Roberts case referred to previously, this court construed Salt Lake City's public lewdness 
ordinance consistent with the state wide public policy. The City had argued the Salt Lake City 
police had the right to ferret out nudity where ever it could be found, so long as the police were 
lawfully in a place of observation. The South Salt Lake ordinance seems to , at one point, be an 
attempt to become a public nudity ordinance, when it attempts to redefine "place open to public 
view" in contradiction to this Court's ruling in Roberts. It never relies on that definition again; but 
the impression that the ordinance is dealing with "public nudity" certainly has stuck in the mind of 
the City's counsel. In Point VI of the brief, however, the City seems to be switching its position. 
The City now seems ready to deny that it is a public nudity ordinance and claim that it is a licensing 
ordinance. Perhaps it can be both; but the City seems to try and make its ordinance a moving target, 
by denying it is whatever Plaintiffs claim it is. If the State of Utah, in its public lewdness law, has 
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set the parameters of what a public place, or "a place open to public view" may be, a contrary 
definition in a South Salt Lake ordinance would clearly be in conflict. The City cites Richfield City 
V. Walker, 790 P.2d 87,90 (Utah App. 1990) for the proposition that a " municipal ordinance need 
not be identical to the controlling state statute to be consistent with it." The point seems to be 
obvious here, however, that the ordinance, if it is a public nudity law, is not consistent with state law 
which defines a public place very much differently. Terms which are defined by state law (whether 
within the statute itself or by court interpretation of it) must have uniform meanings throughout the 
State. The term "open to public view" has been defined by Salt Lake City and this Court, to mean 
something specific, comprehensible, and consistent with State law. South Salt Lake cannot redefine 
the term to mean something that it does not mean in the rest of the State. If the City has chosen to 
do this, its action is void. 
POINT V 
THIS ORDINANCE DOSE NOT ENJOY A CONSTITUTIONAL PRESUMPTION OF 
VALIDITY. 
The City argues that there is a strong presumption of constitutionality which applies to this 
ordinance, and cites State v. Packer, 77 UT 500,297 P. 1013 (1931). The City claims that Plaintiffs' 
authority to the contrary is based on a single U.S. District Court case. This Court has indeed ruled, 
more recently than Packer, that there is a presumption of constitutionality "incident to a 
municipality's exercise of its legislative powers." See Banberrv Development Corporation v. South 
Jordan City, 631 P.2d 899, 904 (Utah 1981). Efforts, however, to censor protected expression do 
not enjoy such a constitutional presumption. In Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 US 147,150-1, 
the Court dealt with a City ordinance requiring a permit for a parade or demonstration. The court 
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said: 
This ordinance as it was written, therefore, fell squarely within the ambit of the many 
decisions of this Court over the last 30 years, holding that a law subjecting the exercise of 
First Amendment freedoms to the prior restraint of a license, without narrow, objective, and 
definite standards to guide the licensing authority, is unconstitutional. "It is settled by a long 
line of recent decisions of this Court that an ordinance which, like this one, makes the 
peaceful enjoyment of freedoms which the Constitution guarantees contingent upon the 
uncontrolled will of an official - as by requiring a permit or license which may be granted 
or withheld in the discretion of such official - is an unconstitutional censorship or prior 
restraint upon the enjoyment of those freedoms. Staub v. Baxlev. 355 U.S. 313, 322. And 
our decisions have made it clear that a person faced with such an unconstitutional licensing 
law may ignore it and engage with impunity in the exercise of the right of free expression 
for which the law purports to require a license. "The Constitution can hardly be thought to 
deny to one subjected to the restrains of such an ordinance the right to attack it's 
constitutionality, because he has not yielded to it's demands." Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 
584, 602 (Stone, C.J., dissenting), adopted per curiam on rehearing, 319 U.S. 103,104. 
When a city deals in the realm of censorship, the court makes no such assumption that the 
law is constitutional. As the United States Supreme Court said in Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products 
Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 71 (n. 20): "The Party seeking to uphold a restriction on commercial speech 
carries the burden of justifying it." See also City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Networks. Inc., 507 
U.S. 410 (1993.) A summary judgment is to be reviewed "in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party." Plaintiffs have certainly overcome the summary judgment. Like the City in 
Alameda Books. Plaintiff should be granted their day in court, and the opportunity to present facts 
sufficient to challenge the constitutionality of this law. 
POINT VI 
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT PROPERLY GRANT SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST 
PLAINTIFF REID. 
Defendant argues in it s brief that the City asked "for a summary judgment, denying all Plaintiffs' 
claims and causes of action." The City goes on to state "it was incumbent upon counsel to respond 
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in full to the City's motion." The City's motion, however, never mentioned either Plaintiff Reid or 
the sections of the ordinance which were in dispute between the City and that Plaintiff. The City 
goes on, in a footnote, to state "there appears to be no argument to be made on behalf of Appellant 
Reid, as it is undisputed that the City has not applied the Ordinance to him or his business." (R. 507) 
(Appellee Br. at 46). That is exactly the point. Because the city has not applied the ordinance to 
Appellant Reid, there was no need to argue the case as to him; and nobody did. Plaintiff Reid only 
asked for his cause of action to be dismissed without prejudice, so that it can be brought again if the 
City changes its mind and attempts to enforce it against him. Because the issues have not been 
litigated, dismissal with prejudice would prevent him from ever having the right to attack the 
ordinance; and that is a denial of due process. 
In a second footnote, the city suggest that "substantial or significant portion" is a "term of 
art" which has been "validated" in other cases. This is not the place to argue the merits of Plaintiff 
Reid's case, as no such arguments were made below. It should be pointed out, however, that a 
similar ordinance is at issue in the pending case of Midvale City Corp. v. Haltom. Case No. 
20010794-SC. That matter has been set for oral arguments on October 2,2002. That is the proper 
forum for that case to be argued, and a decision may well have some effect on Mr. Reid. That issue 
should await the case in which it is properly briefed and argued. In that matter, the ordinance was 
attacked both facially and "as applied" and was tried before the district court for two days, something 
that was denied to these Plaintiffs on all of their claims. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs are entitled to a trial on the merits to determine whether the ordinance is a valid 
regulation of expressive activity. Plaintiffs are fully prepared to meet their burden upon remand. 
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The cause of action brought by Plaintiff Reid, however, should be remanded for the limited 
purpose of dismissal without prejudice. 
DATED this f(j day of September, 2002. 
MCCULLOUGH & ASSOCIATES, L.L.C. 
W. Andrew McCullough 
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South Salt Lake City Council 
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Ladies and Gentlemen: 
This is further correspondence regarding the draft ordinance 
amending Chapter 5.56 of the South Salt Lake Municipal Code 
pertaining to sexually oriented businesses. The draft I am 
referring to in this correspondence is the most recent one I have, 
dated March 12, 2001. I refer herein specifically to the preamble 
to the ordinance and Section I "Purpose and Findings". In making 
my comments, I note that Leather and Lace has been in business in 
South Salt Lake for approximately fifteen years; Paradise Modeling 
has been in business in South Salt Lake for approximately twelve 
years; and American Bush has been in business in South Salt Lake 
for ten years. 
Your draft ordinance starts out with a finding "that sexually 
oriented businesses are frequently used for unlawful sexual 
activities, including prostitution and sexual liaison of a casual 
nature". The term "sexually oriented businesses" (SOB's) is used 
here to cover a number of different kinds of businesses, most of 
which do not operate in South Salt Lake. The only SOB's in South 
Salt Lake sit this point are my three clients, featuring nude 
dancing, and seminude dancing bars. Your City Attorney has been 
kind enough to provide me with records of all police calls around 
my clients' businesses for the last five years. None of them have 
involved "sexual activities, including prostitution". The City 
claims to have relied on "studies" provided by other cities. It 
seems that the most accurate information should be coming directly 
from your own City. It is difficult to say what kind of businesses 
might be "used for unlawful sexual activities", but the businesses 
run by my clients are not. To suggest otherwise is fraudulent. 
The next paragraph of your preamble states the "the concern 
over sexually transmitted diseases is a legitimate health concern 
of the City". It suggests "reasonable regulation of sexually 
oriented businesses". For years, my clients have been required to 
obtain health exams twice a year to determine if they are carrying 
any sexually transmitted diseases. To the best of my knowledge, no 
employee has ever tested positive. Certainly there have been no 
complaints that a sexually transmitted disease was transmitted as 
the result of contact with any of our entertainers. Such contact, 
of course, is prohibited (as will be discussed later). 
Acknowledging that this is not a problem, the draft ordinance 
deletes the requirement for these STD tests. On the one hand, you 
are claiming that stricter regulation is necessary to prevent 
disease; and on the other hand, you are saying that the tests are 
no longer necessary, because they have never yet proved positive. 
Suggesting both of those things in one ordinance is not only 
inconsistent, it is intellectually dishonest. 
Next, your preamble suggests that my clients, because of their 
very nature, "have a deleterious effect on both the existing 
businesses around them and residential areas of the City adjacent 
to them, causing increased crime and the downgrading of property 
values". I am working on obtaining tax assessments for all of my 
clients, and the surrounding businesses. I will note that Paradise 
(2285 South Main Street) is surrounded by new businesses, including 
a large new car lot. The suggestion that my client has created a 
blighted area in that neighborhood is preposterous. American Bush 
has provided me with tax assessments from 1996 through the present. 
They are as follows: 1996, $258,100.00; 1997, $362,400.00; 1998, 
$362,400.00; 1999, 362,400.00; 2000, 434,500.00. The value of my 
clients' property has not quite doubled in five years. The 
deleterious effect on the neighborhood seems to have escaped the 
assessor. I fully expect that businesses in the same neighborhood 
have had similar increases in value. There is certainly no 
suggestion that I have heard, that any of my clients have created, 
or contributed to, any of the conditions generally referred to as 
"urban blight". In fact, because they are zoned into areas away 
from homes, they clearly have contributed to the resurgence of 
areas otherwise consigned to warehouses and other unattractive land 
uses. 
Over the years, the City Council has tinkered with the SOB 
Ordinance, making it more restrictive, and making sure that the 
activities in the businesses are well regulated. Entertainers on 
stage must stay three feet away from their customers. All rooms in 
which entertainers and customers may otherwise be alone together, 
are monitored by video camera. Monitoring stations are open to the 
police at any time; and they have been regularly monitored by South 
Salt Lake vice officers over the years. There are barriers between 
the client and the customer which prevent any unlawful contact; and 
there are no known instances of any sexual contact between 
customers and entertainers in the years that these businesses have 
been there. 
A few years ago, one of your vice officers complained to 
American Bush that he was afraid he could be seen coming in the 
front door, and that any inappropriate activity would cease before 
he could see it. In response, my clients gave him a key to the back 
door where he could come in unobserved any time; and they also gave 
him the alarm code, allowing him to bypass any warning signal. 
Your preamble is followed by a number of "findings", none of 
which have any relevance whatsoever to what has gone on over the 
last ten years in South Salt Lake. To avoid unnecessary length, I 
will respond to each of the 25 findings, by number, as they are 
contained on pages 3-7 of your proposed ordinance: 
1. The present ordinance contains substantial mechanisms to 
make owners of establishments responsible for activities which 
occur on their premises, including bonds which can be forfeited for 
unlawful activities. In the last fifteen years, no action has*been 
taken against any bond. 
2. All information in South Salt Lake is that there are no 
"higher incidents of certain types of illicit sexual behavior" 
associated with any adult business in South Salt Lake. 
3. I am aware of no complaints of masturbation or sexual 
activity in any private or semi private areas run by my clients. 
4. My clients do not encourage unlawful activities; nor do 
they create unhealthy conditions. There have never been any 
complaints to the contrary. 
5. It is ridiculous to suggest that customers come to our 
business ufor the purpose of engaging in sex" . It is not allowed, 
tolerated, or possible. 
6. See my previous comments about the spread of disease. 
7. See response to number 6. 
8. See response to number 6. 
9. See response to number 6. 
10. See response to number 6. 
11. See response to number 6. 
12. See response to number 6. 
13. See response to number 6. 
14. See response to number 6. 
15. My clients do not show "adult" films; and there have 
never been complaints "that semen is found" in businesses operated 
by my clients. 
16. See response to number 6. 
17. There are already reasonable regulations in effect. 
18. There are already reasonable licensing procedures in 
effect. There have never been any problems with them. 
19. All areas accessible to customers are well monitored now. 
Note that, in their fervor, the drafters of the new ordinance have 
provided as follows: 
5.56.210A.3. No private rooms, facilities or similar physical 
arrangement may be located on the premises [to] which patrons 
and/or employees have access. Restrooms are excluded from 
this restriction (emphasis added). 
Note that dressing rooms are not included. It appears that dressing 
rooms will either have to be outfitted with toilets, or the 
employees will have to dress in public. Either way, this makes 
absolutely no sense. 
20. Reasonable licensing is in place. 
21. Reasonable licensing is in place. 
22. The new ordinance deletes this requirement. The City has 
obviously decided that it is not needed. 
23. This is already prohibited. 
24. This is already prohibited. 
25. Since all of the questions relating to the "findings" 
have been previously addressed by the ordinance; and because there 
have not been problems associated with these businesses, it is 
clear that "the general welfare, health, morals and safety of the 
citizens of the City will not be promoted by the enactment of this 
ordinance." 
It has become fashionable to list a number of studies from 
other jurisdictions, and claim that they show what will happen in 
the local jurisdiction, if things are allowed to go on here. The 
11th Circuit Court of Appeals, however, has recently ruled that a 
City that has extensive experience with local adult businesses may 
not ignore that experience and rely solely on the experiences of 
other cities, as set forth in "studies" adopted by the City as 
justification. The case in the 11th Circuit Court, Flanigan' s 
Enterprises, Inc. v. Fulton County, Case No. 00-11152 (11th Cir. 
2/20/2001), involved the City of Atlanta, which conducted a lengthy 
study of its own, and found no correlation between dancers and 
adverse secondary effects. This study by the City of Atlanta is the 
most recent, most thorough, most scientific, and most objective of 
any of the studies. The City of Atlanta, after spending much time 
in obtaining the information, chose to ignore it, because it did 
not fit their requirements. They were prohibited by the Court from 
doing so. It is strongly suggested that a City with as much 
experience with this type of business as South Salt Lake has, may 
also not ignore local realities for "canned" studies provided by 
acknowledged crusaders for "family values". 
If any of you have further questions, please feel free to 
contact me. 
Sincerely yours, 
W. Andrew McCullough 
WAMrsck 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the day of September, 2002,1 mailed two true and correct 
copies of the foregoing Reply Brief of Appellants to Dave Carlson, 220 East Morris Ave., Salt 
Lake City, UT 84115, and Scott Bergthold, 11000 North Scottsdale Rd. Suite 181, Scottsdale, 
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